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Abstract: This paper discusses the adaptation of the settings of
distance relays for multi-terminal lines employing agents. Agents
are software processes capable of searching for information in
networks, interacting with pieces of equipment and performing
tasks on behalf of their owners (relays). Results illustrating the
performance of the adaptive method proposed compared to
conventional fixed settings are presented. It is shown that the
digital relays and agents acting within a communication structure
(also called middleware) can alter adaptive settings to ensure
correct performance over a wide variety of operation conditions,
without the need of an additional communication link. The
proposed relaying scheme can also be utilized for first zone
clearing over the entire line.
Keywords: Distance Protection, Relaying, Three-terminal Lines,
Agent Technology.
I.INTRODUCTION
 Transmission lines may be tapped to provide intermediate
connections to loads, or to reinforce the underlying lower
voltage network through a transformer and such a
configuration is well known as a multi-terminal line [1].
Protection of multi-terminal lines is not as simple as that
of two-terminal lines. They usually experience additional
problems caused by the intermediate infeed from the third
terminal, an outfeed, different line lengths to the tee point,
etc. The limitations of non-pilot distance relays for their
protection have been acknowledged for decades. These
limitations lead to the traditional distance relaying approach
to experience severe underreach and overreach problems.
The relay first zone reach may not even extend beyond the
tee point in some underreach cases [2].
Some approaches based on adaptive relaying were
proposed to face such a situation and some fundamental
concepts can be found in [3]. Horowitz et al [4] define
adaptive relaying as a protection philosophy which permits
and seeks to make adjustments to various protection
functions in order to make them more attuned to prevailing
power system conditions. An adaptive setting concept for
two and three terminal lines, which can respond to changes
in the network conditions, was proposed by Xia et al [5,6].
Stedall et al [7] also proposed an investigation into the use of
adaptive setting techniques for improved distance back-up
protection.
This paper discusses the adaptation of the settings of
distance relays for multi-terminal lines employing agents.
Agents are software processes capable of searching for
information in networks, interacting with pieces of
equipment and performing tasks on behalf of their owners
(relays). Moreover, they are autonomous and cooperative.
Very few publications concerning the application of agents
in the protection field have been reported in the literature.
Tomita et al [8] proposed a cooperative protection system
utilizing agents. Relay agents were constructed, and the
cooperation of the main agents was simulated for primary,
backup and adaptive protection.
Results illustrating the improved performance of the
adaptive method proposed compared to conventional fixed
settings are presented in the following sections. 
II.AGENT TECHNOLOGY
A software agent is a computer program that takes
independent action based on events in the surrounding
environment [9]. Under control of some application that
owns the agent, it is sent forth or placed at some site within a
network where it takes local actions on behalf of its owners.
Agents are dynamic entities. For example, an agent can
exhibit dynamically changing behavior, receiving updated
parameter settings from the owner or from other agents
participating in the same application.  An agent can also
learn from the environment; the term “intelligent” is
sometimes applied to such agents, particularly if the learning
method involves artificial intelligence tools, or neural
networks.
Agents can be further subdivided based on their mobility.
Mobile agents can literally travel from one location to
another while maintaining their state and functionality.  One
imagines such an agent as moving through a network in
search of certain data, or for locations having certain
attributes.  In contrast, local agents are placed by the owner
and then remain in the same location throughout their
computational lives. Both kinds of agents normally have the
ability to communicate with one another making mobility a
lesser benefit than it might appear at first glance.
In the present paper, we consider the simplest kinds of
agents: local, non-intelligent ones. Our work seeks to
demonstrate advantages stemming from the rapid response
time made possible by placing a computational task close to
the point where an action or measurement is needed, and the
simplicity of the power systems architecture afforded by the
ability to send code to general purpose computing platforms.
The basic idea is that by doing so, new control paradigms
can be introduced and executed efficiently, without changing
the basic computing architecture of the power systems
network.
The use of agents raises security considerations that go
beyond those encountered in traditional software systems.
Among the issues that need to be considered are the
mechanism for installing agents and for communicating
parameter updates to them, the means by which a computing
platform or agent authenticates incoming messages, and the
enforcement of agent resource restrictions, such as the use of
scarce computational cycles or space in databases and file
systems.  Prior to deploying agents in mission-critical
settings, one would need satisfying answers on all of these
fronts. Preliminary work towards policies addressing these
issues can be found in [11].
III.THE PROPOSED COMMUNICATION STRUCTURE
AND THE POWER SYSTEM STUDIED
A. The communication structure (middleware)
The computing infrastructure in which our agent
community will operate is a subject of active speculation at
the time of this writing. The existing power grid
communication infrastructure is composed of a hodgepodge
of equipment ranging from high-end fiber optic cables with
large data bandwidth to crude systems with limited data
transfer capabilities to nothing at all. Few utility
communications lines are interconnected. However, this
picture will change as utilities deploy ever more elaborate
control mechanisms, demanding increasingly rich
communication frameworks, steps that can easily be foreseen
as part of the battle to improve operating efficiencies.
The relay scheme proposed here has modest network
resource requirements compared to what we believe will be
available in the near future. It is expected that the need for
greater communication will result in a Utility Intranet (UI)
that would interconnect control areas and their dependent
entities using a relatively high capacity network similar to
the Internet but physically separate from it and dedicated to
the power systems application. However, we caution that
predictions of network bandwidth requirements and total
network capacity can be deceptively reassuring. History has
shown a tendency for networked applications to use all
bandwidth made available to them.
To evaluate the feasibility of employing agents and
network communication in power-systems relay protection,
we need to understand the reliability and latency
requirements of the relays.  By doing so, we can determine
whether or not a proposed combination of network hardware
and communication protocols can meet the protection
system’s needs. Relays play a critical role in power grid
operations with low tolerance for failures. One can identify
that situations in communication between agents used for
relay control might need to take place in as little as 10 ms, a
latency realm leaving little time to recover from data
transmission failures. It is therefore critical to ask whether
available technology can meet those requirements.
The future Utility Intranet will certainly be built from off-
the-shelf Internet-based technology.  To do otherwise would
be unreasonably costly both in terms of initial construction
costs and the concomitantly large maintenance requirements.
Unfortunately, Internet routing hardware lacks any notion of
service quality in network transmissions. Routers, as
currently designed, drop packets when load rises and do so
even before congestion occurs.  This feature is intended to
give the TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) a chance to
reduce data rates before a router becomes completely
overloaded and begins to drop packets.  The approach makes
sense for web browsers and email systems, but we need to
ask what implication this behavior will have for power
systems control.  Within the Internet, all data delivery is
executed on a "best-effort" basis without any possibility to
raise the priority of one message over any other. In control
applications, there are often situations where one needs to
generate high priority events, and we should ask about the
implications of running such applications over a network
that lacks the corresponding capability.
 These points suggest that power systems may need
guarantees of “Quality of Service” (QoS).  Unfortunately,
while QoS has been a very active research topic for many
years, there is such deep disagreement over the right
approach to take (stemming from cost implications
associated with most proposals) that no single solution has
gained market acceptance, nor are standard solutions likely
in the near future.
In order to face some of the network limitations,
communication protocols like Cornell's Spinglass [12] have
been developed. Spinglass allows the user to achieve high
levels of reliability using protocols that probabilistically
mask latency fluctuations and message loss. Spinglass could
be optimized for use in power relaying and might form a
powerful infrastructure for improved protection schemes.
Underlying the study reported here is the idea that if we can
simply understand the real needs of agent-based relay
protection algorithms, we can identify areas of mismatch
between these algorithms and the Internet and can then turn
to Spinglass as a source of possible mechanisms to overcome
the problematic network behavior.
B.  The three-ended system utilized
In order to simulate the real system encountered in
practice, this work makes use of a digital simulator of faulted
transmission lines known as PSCAD/EMTDC
(Electromagnetic Transients and Controls Simulation
Engine)[13]. It should be mentioned that although the
technique described is based on Computer Aided Design
(CAD), practical considerations such as the Capacitor
Voltage Transformer (CVT), Current Transformer (CT) and
Fig. 1  The three-ended system utilized for tests
anti-aliasing filters on system fault data were also included
in the simulation. A 400 kV system with tee configuration is
shown in Fig. 1. The different line lengths are presented in
the figure, as well as the voltage levels at the busbars. This
work focuses on line-to-ground faults, since most faults in
power system transmission lines are of this type.
The protection system associated with this configuration
was simulated for conventional non-pilot protection as well
as a portion of the agent based relaying approach proposed.
Digital distance relays with three zone quadrilateral
characteristics located at terminals 1, 2 and 3 were
simulated. DFT (Discrete Fourier Transform) routines were
utilized in order to filter the faulted waves. Circuit breakers
were associated with the relays in order to isolate the line in
case of an internal fault.
IV.AGENT RELAYS
Fig.2 presents the agent mechanism for protection
purposes. It can be initially divided into an adaptive pre-fault
approach and a post-fault transfer trip action. The
mechanism utilizes local agents at terminals 1, 2 and 3
communicating with each other.
A. Adaptive Pre-fault Approach
The main purpose of the proposed agent mechanism is to
carry out the adaptation of the settings of distance relays for
multi-terminal lines in order to ensure correct performance
over a wide variety of operation conditions.
Initially, local agents for terminals 1, 2 and 3 can be
defined as:
(1) Operation Agent: This is a local agent, which monitors
the operating condition at a terminal. The following
parameters related to the system condition must be
obtained from on-line measurements and/or
calculations:
• Pre-fault busbar voltages
• Power transfer angles
• Source impedances
(2) Breaker Status Agent: This local agent monitors
changes in the system topology based on circuit breaker
status.
The two local agents, shown in Fig.2, must communicate
with the Coordination Agent, as defined in item 3.
(3) Coordination Agent: The coordination agent collects
information, makes decision, and disseminates
information to the other two Coordination agents. The
Coordination Agent at each terminal can then choose
the correct relay characteristic, based on the information
received.
We propose that a group of settings be calculated off-line,
and that these parameters be renewed from time to time as
the system condition changes beyond a certain limit, based
on the Coordination Agent information. Then, when a fault
occurs the relay will operate close to its ideal characteristic.
B. First Zone Transfer Trip
This action takes place after the fault occurrence. In order
to decrease the clearance time, when a fault is detected in the
first zone of any of the relays located at the three terminals, a
trip signal is sent through the communication network to the
other two ends. A First Zone Local Agent coordinates the
first zone transfer trip.
The substation host computer executes the communication
between local agents at different terminals, as described in
the earlier section. It also receives relevant information in
order to adapt local relays to the best characteristic available
for the system operating condition. The new setting is then
downloaded to the relay.
C. Hierarchical Structure
The hierarchical system for distance protection, based on
agent technology, is shown in Fig. 3. Digital relays are the
lowest level of this hierarchy.  All the digital relays are
linked to the substation host computer. This host acts as a
data concentrator for all historical and oscillography records
collected by the digital relays. It also has an interface to the
station operators [14]. The substation host computer is
finally connected to a communication network, as described
in section III.A.
Terminal 2















Fig. 2 Agent mechanism in one terminal for protection purpose
Fig.3 Hierarchical System
D. Discussion
One issue that has not been raised up to this point is why
agents are used in the proposed protection system rather than
another means of signal processing and communication. We
expect that a number of new applications will be developed
to take advantage of the Utility Intranet’s potential. It is
likely that new feature requirements will arise that were
never anticipated. A flexible UI communication architecture
based on open standards is the best insurance against a
never-ending series of incompatible system updates. The
integrated computation and communication, that are the
defining characteristics of agent technology, form an
excellent foundation for a general approach to power systems
solutions utilizing a Utility Intranet. When one wishes to add
intelligence or other characteristics to an agent operation, it
is easily done within the agent framework. Similarly, new
communication protocols or application-level additions such
as data stream compression can be implemented in agents
without affecting the other portions of agent operations. New
tasks can be added seamlessly by adding new agents to a
system rather than modifying existing code. Mobility is also
 an easy extension to agent operation, if it is required. In
short, agents were designed to operate at a level of
abstraction that is both appropriate and compatible with a
dynamic system like the developing utility communications
infrastructure when coupled with the expected growth of
applications that take advantage of its potential.
V. RESULTS OBTAINED UTILIZING AGENT
TECHNOLOGY – AN IMPROVEMENT
A. Adaptive Pre-fault Approach
Distance relaying techniques have attracted considerable
attention for the protection of transmission lines. The
principle of this technique measures the impedance at a
fundamental frequency between the relay location and the
fault point, thus determining if a fault is internal or external
to a protection zone. The relationship between voltage and
current is used for this purpose. This relationship is
disturbed when there is infeed or outfeed. As mentioned
earlier, this can make the relay experience severe underreach
or overreach problems, especially considering non-pilot
protection schemes for three terminal lines. Another
situation that has to be taken into account is when the tap is
not working for some reason. The setting of distance relays
must reflect all the situations described earlier. Fig. 4(a)
shows the typical non-pilot distance protection with different
zones for a three terminal line at the condition represented
in Fig. 1. As shown in the figure, only approximately 20
from 210 km obtained instantaneous trip from the three ends
of the lines in the case of an internal fault. Fig. 4(b)
illustrates the improvement that can be found with the
adaptive scheme utilizing Agents that is proposed in this
work. The instantaneous trip area increased to
approximately 67 km (more than three times the non-pilot
condition) for the same situation. As mentioned before, the
proposed adaptive scheme can alter settings to ensure better
performance over a wide variety of operation conditions.
B. First Zone Transfer Trip
In order to highlight the efficiency of the proposed
scheme, this section presents some tables comparing the
clearance time for the conventional non-pilot protection as
well as for the proposed scheme utilizing Agents.
Table 1 presents the clearance time for the three-ended
line shown in Fig. 1, considering a non-pilot protection.
Line-to-ground faults are applied to different locations on
leg 1-T, considering different fault inception angles and fault
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(b)Agent Technology proposed – Adaptive pre-fault scheme
Fig. 4 Distance relaying of a three ended transmission line
Table 1  Clearance time for a three-ended line non-pilot protection,
considering different fault locations on leg 1-T (100 km),
different fault inception angles,  line-to-ground fault and Rf =
10 ohms.






























10 0o Z1 0.053 Z2 0.359 Z2 0.354
20 0o Z1 0.053 Z2 0.359 Z2 0.354
30 0o Z1 0.053 Z2 0.359 Z2 0.354
40 0o Z1 0.053 Z2 0.359 Z2 0.354
50 90o Z1 0.047 Z2 0.353 Z2 0.353
60 90o Z1 0.048 Z2 0.355 Z2 0.350
70 90o Z1 0.048 Z2 0.355 Z2 0.348
80 90o Z1 0.053 Z1 0.057 Z2 0.354
90 45o Z1 0.051 Z1 0.056 Z1 0.055




Table 2  Clearance time for a three-ended line using Agent theory,
considering different fault locations on leg 1-T (100 km),
different fault inception angles, line-to-ground fault and Rf =
10 ohms. Notice the dramatic improvements in protection
zones relative to Table 1.






























10 0o Z1 0.053 Z2 0.063 Z2 0.063
20 0o Z1 0.053 Z2 0.063 Z2 0.063
30 0o Z1 0.053 Z1 0.053 Z2 0.063
40 0o Z1 0.053 Z1 0.053 Z2 0.063
50 90o Z1 0.048 Z1 0.049 Z2 0.058
60 90o Z1 0.048 Z1 0.048 Z2 0.058
70 90o Z1 0.049 Z1 0.049 Z2 0.059
80 90o Z1 0.059 Z1 0.050 Z1 0.059
90 45o Z1 0.05 Z1 0.049 Z1 0.050


















Table 2 shows the clearance time for the studied three
ended line using Agent technology. The same situation
concerning fault locations, fault inception angles and fault
resistance is considered.
It should be noted that an opening time of approximately
three cycles for the circuit breaker utilized was considered. It
isolates the fault by interrupting the current at or near a
current zero. A coordination delay for zone two of the order
of 0.3 s was also utilized.
As mentioned before, in the proposed technology, when a
fault is detected in the first zone of any of the relays located
at the three terminals, a trip signal is sent through the
communication network to the other two ends in order to
isolate the fault. A transfer trip time of 10 ms is considered.
A considerable decrease in clearance time considering the
proposed scheme can be observed. This scheme is similar to
a pilot relaying system utilizing a dedicated communication
channel to produce tripping at all other terminals.
VI. CONCLUSION
An application of agents acting within a communication
structure to adaptive relay settings for multi-terminal lines
was presented in this paper. Results illustrating the
performance of the new method proposed compared to
conventional fixed settings were shown. The new approach
based on agents was divided in an adaptive pre-fault
approach and a post-fault transfer trip action. In order to test
the proposed scheme, a digital simulation of a faulted
transmission line was performed utilizing the
PSCAD/EMTDC software. The protection system associated
with this configuration was also simulated both for
conventional non-pilot protection as well as for the Agent
based relaying. The results showed that the new approach
would alter adaptive settings to ensure correct performance
over a wide variety of operation conditions, which is an
improvement compared to fixed settings for the relays.
Moreover, a considerable decrease in clearance time
compared to conventional non-pilot protection was observed.
It should then be emphasized that the new approach is not
only a solution for a well-known problem, but also a very
attractive alternative to improve the performance of
protection systems in the new millennium.
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